BANGKOK, Dec. 9, 2025 — Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), the opposition administration formed after the 2021 military coup, is facing rising criticism at home and fresh pressure abroad as its reform effort struggles to gain support.

The government-in-exile, once seen by many citizens as the main vehicle for democratic change, is now under fire for slow decision-making, weak coordination and corruption claims inside its own ranks. At the same time, the military junta has pushed ahead with plans for elections that critics call a sham and has regained leverage with help from neighboring powers.

 

The NUG was created by ousted lawmakers and their allies in the months after the coup. It promised to build a federal democracy, coordinate armed resistance and lobby foreign governments to isolate the generals.

Four years later, many of those early supporters say the structure has grown heavy and hard to manage. Young fighters on the ground complain about irregular funding and unclear chains of command. Families of displaced civilians say aid has become harder to access as donor money falls.

Activists and analysts warn that the opposition risks losing momentum just as the junta tries to present its planned December elections as a return to normal politics.

 

Outside Myanmar, regional powers have played an important role in shaping the conflict.

China has pushed several northern ethnic armed organizations to reduce their campaigns against the military and to reopen trade routes that are important for Chinese business interests. Some groups stopped supplying weapons to resistance forces. Others agreed to hand back towns that were captured during earlier offensives.

These moves, negotiated far from public view, have weakened anti-junta operations in several border areas. Commanders from resistance groups say they now need to shift tactics and rebuild supply lines.

Diplomats in the region note that Beijing still wants stability along its border more than it wants any particular side to win the war. That stance often puts the NUG and its allies at a disadvantage.

 

The United States had long been seen as one of the strongest supporters of Myanmar’s democracy movement. This year, that picture changed.

 

First, aid workers and exiled media outlets were hit by funding cuts after the Trump administration shut down major USAID programs. Then, on Nov. 24, the Department of Homeland Security moved to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for roughly 4,000 Myanmar nationals living in the United States.

 

The department said conditions had improved enough in Myanmar to make return possible and argued that extended TPS was no longer in the U.S. national interest. Human rights groups and Myanmar community leaders strongly disagreed, pointing to ongoing airstrikes, forced conscription and mass displacement across the country.

 

NUG officials said they had sent letters and legal arguments to Washington in advance, but they failed to secure a reversal. Critics asked why the opposition could gain attention in Congress but could not win over the executive branch, which controls immigration rules.

 

Pressure on the NUG increased sharply in mid-2025, when Mandalay-based activist Dr Tayzar San published a widely shared message accusing the leadership of moving too slowly on reform.

 

He said the government had become inefficient and was not listening to people on the ground. His comments struck a nerve among supporters who had already grown impatient with internal disputes and long meetings that produced few visible changes.

 

For several months the NUG offered only limited responses. Officials said reform was under discussion, but they did not publish a clear timeline or list of proposals. That silence allowed frustration to spread on social media and inside resistance networks.

 

On Dec. 8, the NUG finally announced a new restructuring plan. Under the changes, some ministries were merged and four were dissolved, including international cooperation, commerce, communications and women, youth and children’s affairs.

 

Most senior leaders kept their positions, but some portfolios shifted. Former health and education minister Dr Zaw Wai Soe moved to the prime minister’s office. Deputy education minister Ja Htoi Pan was promoted to minister.

 

Supporters said the shake-up could reduce overlap and speed up decision-making. However, many grassroots activists described the move as too small and too late. They noted that few new figures were brought into top roles and said the plan did not address deeper concerns about transparency and accountability.

 

The sense of crisis intensified when Dr Sasa, a prominent ethnic Chin politician and international advocate for the resistance, resigned as minister of international cooperation shortly before the restructuring.

In public remarks, he said he had been informed months earlier that his ministry would be dissolved. He called for a unified revolutionary army, a more professional financial system and better management of natural resources in areas outside junta control.

 

He then launched a new body, the Institute for Peace and Federal Democracy, and vowed to keep supporting the struggle from outside the NUG. His supporters praised his record of lobbying foreign governments. Critics accused him of abandoning the team at a difficult moment.

 

Whatever the motives, his exit highlighted the deep divisions inside the opposition camp.

 

Soon after news of Dr Sasa’s resignation, a separate controversy erupted inside the NUG’s prime minister’s office. Twelve staff members filed a formal complaint accusing senior official Kyi Pyar and her husband Nyi Nyi Min of corruption, nepotism and abuse of power.

The NUG suspended the pair and opened an investigation. Officials said the process would follow internal rules, but they released few details on timelines or evidence.

A Facebook page apparently run by complainants posted regular updates and accused the leadership of trying to slow the case. The page quickly gained followers and became a focus for anger about broader issues of patronage and favoritism.

For many supporters, the episode raised doubts about how many similar problems might exist elsewhere in the system and whether the NUG is willing to clean up its own house while asking the world to trust it as a future government.

 

Independent analysts say 2025 may become a turning point for the National Unity Government and for the wider opposition movement.

 

Some experts argue that the junta has been more flexible than the NUG in recent months. Military leaders consult advisors, adjust strategy and remove commanders who fail. The opposition, they say, often holds onto structures and posts even when they do not work.

 

Others warn against writing off the NUG. They point out that it still enjoys strong moral legitimacy among many citizens, especially compared with the widely hated military council. The government-in-exile also maintains foreign offices and diplomatic ties that resistance groups on the ground cannot replace.

 

What most observers agree on is that reform is no longer optional. Clearer structures, better communication and visible anti-corruption measures will be needed if the NUG wants to rebuild trust.

 

For now, the opposition in Myanmar remains fragmented but determined. Young fighters continue to train and launch operations in many regions. Civilian networks still raise funds and deliver basic services in areas outside junta control.

 

However, exhaustion is growing. Many people who left their homes after the coup are now entering their fifth year in temporary camps or foreign cities. They want answers about how long the struggle will last and what concrete steps their leaders are taking.

 

As the junta prepares to stage its elections and foreign governments reassess their policies, the way the NUG responds to this year’s crises may decide whether it can stay at the center of the democracy movement — or whether new structures will emerge to take its place.

 

 

Q1. What is the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar?

The NUG is an opposition administration formed by lawmakers and activists after the 2021 military coup. It seeks to replace military rule with a federal democratic system.

 

Q2. Why is the NUG under pressure to reform in 2025?

Supporters and activists say the NUG has grown slow and heavy, with unclear decision-making, internal disputes, and corruption claims that damage public trust.

 

Q3. How did the United States change its policy toward Myanmar in 2025?

The U.S. cut some aid programs and moved to end Temporary Protected Status for thousands of Myanmar nationals, saying conditions had improved enough for return.

 

Q4. What impact did Dr Sasa’s resignation have on the movement?

His resignation removed one of the NUG’s best-known international advocates and highlighted deep disagreements over strategy, funding and organizational reform.

 

Q5. Can the NUG still play a central role in Myanmar’s democracy movement?

Analysts say it can, but only if it carries out real reforms, improves transparency and responds more quickly to the needs of fighters and civilians on the ground.